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Abstract: A Markov-switching model with time-varying transition probabilities is applied to sub-
Saharan African data to examine the link between output collapses and growth. In the model, the
growth rate moves discretely between two regimes; one characterised by a stable positive average
growth rate, and a collapse regime characterised by negative and volatile growth rate. The aim is
to derive plausible estimates of the transition probabilities for the Markov chain component.
These estimates are then included in a vector of time-varying country-specific variables for the
Markov-switching estimation. The results show that the probability of an economy remaining in
a stable growth regime increases with institutional quality, education, improving terms of trade
and increased concentration on manufacturing industries. The analysis takes into account the fact
that the dynamics of output following a large collapse differs significantly from the dynamics of
output during more stable time periods by taking a non-linear approach. 
I INTRODUCTION
T
he failure of most sub-Saharan African economies to conform to economic
growth theory is a puzzle that remains largely unanswered. One
unwanted characteristic that most sub-Saharan African economies share is
the prevalence and magnitude of output collapses. Research into output
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02 Byrne Article_ESRI Vol 41  25/02/2010  14:30  Page 21collapses remains largely unexplored. Much of the focus of growth
econometrics has been on cross-country analysis, ignoring the volatility of
growth patterns. Concentrating on average growth rates gives little insight
into the growth patterns of an individual country or how the growth rates
evolve over time. Economic growth, particularly in developing economies,
undergoes frequent episodes in which the behaviour of the series changes
significantly. The growth path of such economies are often characterised by
large swings and fluctuations. In these periods the application of linear models
seems inappropriate because the changes in regime can alter the long-run
growth path of an economy. 
In this paper, a Markov-switching model with time-varying transition
probabilities is applied to sub-Saharan African data to examine the link
between output collapses and growth. In the model, the growth rate moves
discretely between two regimes; one characterised by a stable positive average
growth rate, and a collapse regime characterised by a negative and volatile
growth rate. The Markov-switching model with time varying transition
probabilities developed by Diebold et al. (1994) is the key component of the
analysis. While some authors have postulated various transition probabilities
and assessed the different choices, ‘real world’ estimates are preferable.
Therefore, the initial aim is to derive plausible estimates of the transition
probabilities for the Markov chain component. These estimates are then
included in a vector of time-varying country-specific variables for the Markov-
switching estimation. The results show that the probability of an economy
remaining in a stable growth regime increases with institutional quality,
education, improving terms of trade and increased concentration on
manufacturing industries. The analysis takes into account the fact that the
dynamics of output following a large collapse differs significantly from the
dynamics of output during more stable time periods by taking a non-linear
approach. 
An output collapse is defined as a fall in the level of output in an economy
that is in excess of 10 per cent over a three-year period (Durlauf et al., 2004).
Output collapses occur far more frequently in sub-Saharan Africa than in the
developed world or emerging economies (Becker and Mauro, 2006). No single
factor provides a satisfactory answer as to why this is the case. The most
common explanation offered is that these collapses take place during periods
of intense civil war, but civil war only partially explains the extent of such
collapses among sub-Saharan African nations. To illustrate how dramatic
collapses are, Table 1 shows the ten largest real output drops for OECD
countries and African countries between 1980 and 2000.1 It is clear from
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distinct pattern emerges. The largest output drops among this group of
countries are all consistent with worldwide external shocks. The world oil
shock in 1979 led to a fall in world oil production of 8.9 per cent while the
Persian Gulf War in 1990 generated a fall in world oil production of 8.8 per
cent. Finland was also contending with the fall of communism in the
neighbouring Soviet Union. There is no such consistency among the output
drops of the African nations.
Table 1: Top Ten Output Drops for OECD and African Countries Between
1980 and 2000
OECD Output  Time African Output Time 
Country Drop (%) Period Country Drop (%) Period
Finland 13.11 1990-1993 Chad 49.85 1980-1983
Switzerland 9.92 1990-1993 Rwanda 46.70 1991-1994
Greece 7.62 1991-1994 Angola 41.27 1990-1993
Iceland 7.17 1990-1993 DR Congo 36.27 1992-1995
Sweden 7.12 1990-1993 Mauritania 34.48 1985-1988
Spain 6.80 1990-1993 Tanzania 34.43 1987-1990
Netherlands 5.86 1990-1993 Mali 33.94 1985-1988
Canada 5.79 1980-1983 Cameroon 33.50 1987-1990
USA 5.37 1980-1983 Nigeria 32.04 1997-2000
UK 3.59 1980-1983 Togo 29.55 1994-1997
Countries that endure output collapses display a high level of volatility
around their average growth rate. Unless periods of large drops in output are
accounted for, little can be inferred through standard econometric analysis
because the dynamics of output following a large collapse can differ
significantly from the dynamics of output during stable time periods. Pritchett
(2000) observed that comparing countries with similar long-run growth rates
but vastly differing volatility levels can lead to biased results. Following the
identification of the variables to be used in determining the transition
probabilities, the time-varying, two-state Markov-switching model is applied
to test the hypothesis that an output collapse causes an economy to switch
regimes, thus altering its long run growth path. Two distinct regimes are
identified – one characterised by relatively stable positive growth rates, the
other a collapse regime characterised by volatile negative average growth
rates. 
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The graph above illustrates the growth experiences of Kenya and The
Republic of Congo. Over a twenty year period, the average annual growth
rates of these countries were 0.65 per cent and 0.68 per cent respectively.
Although the average growth rates are almost identical, it is clear that the
growth experiences of the two countries were very different. Higher frequency
growth regressions mix the determinants of long-term growth and abrupt
shorter-term movement, so including these two countries in such a regression
will not take into account how differently growth has evolved. The fact that
economic variables behave differently depending upon the stage of the
business cycle also needs to be considered in any meaningful analysis.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides further
motivation for this study and reviews the related literature; real world
estimates of the transition probabilities for the Markov chain component are
defined and estimated using ordinary least squares analysis in Section III.
The two-state time-varying Markov-switching model is defined in Section IV.
Section V presents the results and Section VI concludes.
II  FURTHER MOTIVATION AND RELATED STUDIES
A substantial body of literature has emerged regarding convergence. Barro
and Sala-I-Martin (1992) and Mankiw et al. (1992) examine β-convergence,
where there is a negative partial correlation between growth in income over
24 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
02 Byrne Article_ESRI Vol 41  25/02/2010  14:30  Page 24time and its initial level. Sala-I-Martin (1996) concludes that the estimated
speeds of β-convergence are so similar across cross-sectional data sets that
economies converge at a rate of 2 per cent per year. Quah (1993) notes that b-
convergence is uninformative for distribution dynamics because cross-section
regressions only capture average behaviour. He describes a theoretical model
of ideas and growth where convergence clubs form endogenously. Alternative
empirics based on studying the dynamics of evolving distributions are
suggested. σ-convergence is viewed as the reduction of the differences in per
capita incomes across time, usually measured by the standard deviation of the
regional income distribution. Quah (1997) argues in favour of analysing the
distribution dynamics directly.
A cursory glance at countries around the world shows vastly differing
levels of volatility. Table 2 shows the growth rates and standard deviations of
a sample of 89 countries from around the world from 1960 to 2003. The
countries with the most volatile growth rates are mainly found in sub-Saharan
Africa, the region with the most frequent and catastrophic output collapses. 
Empirical studies have found that over one hundred variables
significantly contribute towards determining the economic growth rate.
Besides raising serious endogeneity issues, it would be counter-productive to
include each of these variables in our vector of country-characteristics, so I
focus instead on those variables most likely to significantly contribute to the
poor growth performance of sub-Saharan African economies. 
Empirical evidence finds a strong link between terms of trade and
economic growth. Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2004) find that increases
in investment and trade, real exchange rate depreciation and changes to
political regimes help explain the reasons behind periods of economic
acceleration, while Becker and Mauro (2006) find that adverse changes in the
terms of trade are the most costly type of shock for developing countries. They
also find that the duration and magnitude of output drops is approximately
twice as large for developing countries as it is for emerging countries. One
reason for this may be the reliance of most sub-Saharan African economies on
primary commodity or extractive industries. The concentration of many
nations on particular industries, especially agriculture contributes to output
collapses. Prices of primary commodities are falling relative to prices of
manufactured commodities contributing to slow economic growth while
drought and crop disease often lead to large falls in crop yield. Primary
commodity production has been found to be one of the most robust
determinants of slow economic growth (Sala-I-Martin, 1997). 
Extractive industries are also a primary source of revenue for many sub-
Saharan African economies. Of sub-Saharan Africa’s total exports 57 per cent
are comprised of mining products yet these products make up only 13 per cent
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Table 2: Growth Rates and Standard Deviations of Countries Around the
World
Growth Growth
Country Mean SD Country Mean SD
Africa Asia
Algeria 1.62 8.44 Afghanistan –2.27 11.62
Botswana 6.19 6.72 Bangladesh 0.51 5.93
Ghana 2.38 9.18 Hong Kong 5.23 5.00
Kenya 0.27 3.72 India 2.91 2.95
Lesotho 3.01 7.44 Iran 1.94 7.84
Liberia –2.68 18.55 Iraq 1.86 22.92
Malawi 1.39 5.84 Israel 2.58 4.36
Mauritius 3.29 4.45 Japan 3.85 3.83
Mozambique 1.51 6.33 Jordan –0.27 6.64
Niger –0.67 6.58 Korea (South) 6.12 4.22
Senegal –0.34 4.85 Malaysia 4.60 3.64
Sierra Leone –0.90 5.83 Nepal 1.49 3.14
South Africa 1.28 2.01 Pakistan 2.81 2.70
Sudan 1.43 4.33 Philippines 1.35 3.58
Swaziland 3.06 5.51 Singapore 4.60 4.74
Tanzania 2.02 9.44 Sri Lanka 3.68 3.04
Togo –0.21 5.79 Syria 2.52 9.66
Tunisia 3.18 3.93 Taiwan 6.39 3.19
Uganda 0.87 5.52 Thailand 4.71 3.77
DR Congo –1.79 9.19
Zambia 0.37 8.54
Zimbabwe 0.47 9.03
North America, Central America 
and Caribbean Europe
Barbados 1.91 4.25 Austria 2.76 2.19
Canada 2.36 2.32 Belgium 2.66 2.15
Costa Rica 1.73 3.12 Cyprus 4.93 7.63
Dominican Republic 3.14 5.34 Denmark 2.05 2.52
El Salvador 1.16 2.88 Finland 2.59 3.62
Guatemala 0.96 2.28 France 2.57 1.90
Haiti 0.72 5.47 Germany 2.25 2.14
Honduras 0.78 3.71 Greece 3.03 4.00
Jamaica 0.66 3.94 Iceland 2.92 4.69
Mexico 1.89 3.58 Ireland 3.99 3.19
Nicaragua –0.55 5.44 Italy 2.64 2.28
Panama 2.78 4.15 Malta 5.90 5.22
Trinidad and Tobago 2.66 8.03 Netherlands 2.24 2.11
United States 2.41 2.28 Norway 2.97 1.79
Portugal 3.68 3.82
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countries with an abundance of natural resources have lower levels of GDP
per capita and are characterised by stagnation of growth, while Busby et al.
(2003) show that different types of natural resource endowments lead to
differing capacities to respond to economic shocks. Van der Ploeg and
Poelhekke (2009) find that the negative indirect effect of natural resources on
growth performance through increased volatility outweigh the beneficial
direct effects of natural resource abundance on economic growth. Of the 168
incidences of output collapses in this study, 113 occurred in countries where
output is predominantly from the agricultural sector. Fifty-three occurred in
countries where fuel and mining products are the main source of output and
just two in countries where output is primarily from the manufacturing
industry. 
Previous studies have also shown that trade is a crucial determinant of
economic growth. Crespo-Cuaresma and Worz (2003) find a positive correla  -
tion between high-end technology intensive exports and growth. Blattman et
al. (2003) show that terms of trade movements is an important determinant of
economic performance and that less developed countries at the periphery are
more sensitive to terms of trade volatility. 
Prior to the most recent research, the explanation most often offered to
explain output collapses is that they occur during periods of intense civil war.
Civil wars cause increasing levels of uncertainty in relation to economic
conditions, which in turn lead to increased risk to investment and subsequent
capital flight. In sub-Saharan Africa, twenty-nine of the thirty-nine countries
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Table 2: Growth Rates and Standard Deviations of Countries Around the
World (contd.)
Growth Growth
Country Mean SD Country Mean SD
South America Spain 3.25 2.75
Argentina 0.69 5.40 Sweden 1.98 2.14
Bolivia 0.54 3.67 Switzerland 1.41 2.61
Brazil 2.24 3.91 Turkey 2.25 3.90
Chile 2.23 5.48 United Kingdom 2.21 1.96
Colombia 1.81 1.81
Ecuador 1.55 4.70 Pacific
Paraguay 1.46 3.16 Australia 2.33 1.90
Peru 0.82 5.44 Fiji 1.59 6.49
Uruguay 1.02 5.37 New Zealand 1.42 3.10
Venezuela 0.20 5.21 Papua New Guinea 3.76 10.65
02 Byrne Article_ESRI Vol 41  25/02/2010  14:30  Page 27in the sample have experienced civil war during the period examined. The
conventional wisdom is to halt development efforts during periods of conflict
and redirect aid towards immediate relief programmes. Undoubtedly, there
are complex interactions between events associated directly with war and the
economy that contribute toward falling output. Rodrik (2000) argues that
domestic social conflicts are the main reason behind growth collapses because
internal conflict reduces a country’s ability to deal with the impact of external
shocks. Collier (1999) finds that civil war reduces annual growth by
approximately 2.2 per cent. In a comprehensive study of growth econometrics,
Durlauf  et al. (2004) point out that although civil war is most likely a
contributing factor to an output collapse, the collapses are too common an
occurrence and too significant in magnitude for civil war to be the only factor.
Including a variable for civil war in the regression analysis is problematic.
Estimating the causal effect of economic growth and civil war is extremely
difficult. Does civil war lead to lower growth or does low growth cause civil
war? Estimating the impact through an instrumental variables technique
ultimately leads to the same issue of multi-collinearity. It is, however,
reasonable to assume that countries with low levels of institutions are more
prone to civil war because institutions can lead to a better management of
conflicts and ethnic diversity. The quality of institutions reflect the extent of
social divisions. Easterly et al. (2006) find that societies with lower initial
inequality and more linguistic homogeneity have more social cohesion and
thus a better quality of institutions.
Institutional quality is a central factor to economic activity (Rodrik, 2004),
Aron, (2000). Foreign firms are much more likely to invest in countries that
have a good legal system which allows for legal contracts to be defined and
enforced, thus giving stability to their investment. By attracting foreign
investment, countries can accumulate capital and knowledge and thus enjoy
long-term growth. Barro (1999) estimated the effect of an improvement of the
rule of law on growth. Using figures from the Economic Freedom Index, he
found that an improvement by one category in the political risk section
increases growth by 0.5 per cent per annum and that most of this increase
occurs through an increase in investment. Institutions have both a direct
effect on growth and an indirect effect. Improving institutional quality can
indirectly affect growth through increased investment, increased integration
and trade, increased stock of social capital, improved management of conflicts
and increased political stability. 
Research has also shown that education plays an important role in
determining the growth rate in an economy Barro, 1991, Hanushek and
Woessman (2009). A group of models (for example, Lucas, 1988; Mankiw et al.,
1992) views human capital as an input in the production function that can be
accumulated by investment in schooling, or learning by doing. In such models,
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education will be included in the initial analysis.
Following the identification of the causes of an output collapse, the focus
of the paper changes to concentrate on capturing the effect these collapses
have on the long-run growth path. In order to achieve this, a two-regime
Markov-switching model with time-varying transitional properties is applied.
Initially explored by Hamilton (1989), the Markov-switching model is widely
used as it allows for non-linearities in the economic growth process. One
limitation of Hamilton’s model is that the transition properties are fixed. The
use of a regime-switching model that allows for probabilities to change over
time can yield more accurate estimates of the process. Filardo (1994) and
Diebold et al. (1994) developed the Markov-switching model with time-varying
transition probabilities in order to capture the systematic changes in the
transition probabilities before and after turning points. By applying the time-
varying model, underlying economic fundamentals and policy shocks can
affect the transition probabilities. Markov-switching models have been used to
analyse business cycle fluctuations (Diebold et al., 1994; Engel and Hakkio,
1996; Moolman, 2004), risk-return tradeoffs in emerging markets (Chang and
Ho, 2007) and Colombian economic growth (Misas and Ramirez, 2006). 
The main advantage of regime switching models is their ability to model
series that have irregular cycles. Regime switching models are characterised
by a number of distinct and discrete regimes within which different model
parameters apply. The model will periodically switch from one regime to
another and these switches represent structural changes occurring in the
process that is being modelled. The hypothesis here is that the economic
growth process of sub-Saharan African economies can be thought of as
switching between two regimes; one a relatively stable growth regime, the
other characterised by volatile and negative growth. 
III TIME-SERIES  ANALYSIS
The first stage of the analysis focuses on the causes of an output collapse.
The ordinary least squares analysis is conducted in order to give some idea of
the variables to be included in the vector of country-characteristics for the
Markov-switching model. The initial model regresses the fall in output on the
variables discussed in the previous section – education, terms of trade,
institutions and the composition of output. The literature suggests that
growth regressions may be subject to endogeneity issues, leading to biased
results. For example, the results can be biased because the quality of
institutions may be endogenous to the level of development of a country. It
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good institutions. A solution often used is to apply an instrumental variables
approach to account for this bias (Acemoglu et al., 2008). In this case, however,
the dependent variable is the fall in output as opposed to output levels.
Therefore, it is possible that variables such as institutions and education
levels are less likely to be determined by a change in output than they are by
output levels.
Data
The period examined is 1960 to 20042 and includes all sub-Saharan
economies for which there is available data. The measure of output collapse is
the percentage drop in GDP per worker over each three-year period. Data for
GDP/Worker is taken from the Heston et al., dataset.3 GDP per worker is used
because it is a more accurate measure of productivity than GDP per capita.
Terms of Trade data is taken from the World Trade Organisation International
Trade Statistics, and the measure of institutional quality comes from the
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP). Data on educational attainment
is obtained from the Lee and Barro (2001) dataset. 
The Model
The model takes the following form:
β0 + β1(Edu) + β2(T.O.T) + β3(Inst.) + β4(Manuf)
Yt =   (1)
+ β5(Agr.) + β6(Fuel) + ui
These variables are explained in more detail in Table 3.
Table 3: Notation and Explanation of Variables in Model
Notation Explanation
yt Percentage drop in output in country i between time t and time t+3.
Edu Level of education in country i at time t.
TOT Terms of trade in country i at time t (1980=100).
Inst Quality of institutions in country I at time t.
Manuf Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if <50 per cent of output is
made up of manufacturing products and 0 otherwise.
Agr Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if <50 per cent of output is
made up of agricultural products and 0 otherwise.
Fuel Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if <50 per cent of output is
made up of fuel and mining products and 0 otherwise.
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The results from the model are presented below.




Terms of Trade –0.048 0.001***
Institutions –1.546 5.5E-05***
Agriculture Dummy 2.82856 0.0689*
Fuel Dummy –2.1710 0.2134
Manufacturing Dummy –6.3639 0.0037**
R2 0.432
Observations 1,609
*Denotes significance at 10 per cent level, **denotes significance at 5 per cent level, 
*** denotes significance at 1 per cent level.
All variables except the dummy fuel variable are found to be statistically
significant and of the expected sign. Deterioration in terms of trade and poor
institutional quality both contribute to a collapse in output. The finding that
predominantly agricultural economies are more volatile than predominantly
manufacturing economies conforms to previous findings. The coefficient on the
manufacturing dummy is high. This fits in with the data because only two of
the collapses in the sample occur in countries where output comes from
predominately manufacturing industries.
The variables that have been found to be statistically significant in this
analysis will be included in the transitional probability vector for the Markov-
switching analysis.
IV MARKOV  SWITCHING  ANALYSIS
As mentioned previously, output collapses are more prevalent and of
longer duration in sub-Saharan Africa than any other region of the world. In
the preceding section I established the causes of these collapses. The issue I
address now is the effect such output collapses have on the long-run growth
prospects of an economy. The growth path of a country displays different
behaviour during periods of stable growth and periods of collapse. In order to
capture this asymmetry, I apply a two-state Markov-switching model with
time-varying transition probabilities. The regime-switching model combines
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is likely to be in at a certain time determines which set of parameters
(coefficients) should be applied. For example, a two-state switching model
takes the form:
x(t) × b1, s(t) = 1
Yt =  (2)
x(t) × b2, s(t) = 2
Where s(t) denotes the state the economy is in at time t. The first set of
parameter estimates apply to the observed independent variables when the
system is in state 1; the second set apply when the system is in state 2. This
system can be extended to incorporate any number of regimes. s(t)i s
determined by a Markov chain which itself depends on a transition matrix.
The transition matrix gathers the probabilities that one particular state is
followed by another particular state. In modelling the regime changes, it is
assumed that at some point in the sample, the mean value of the growth rate
will shift to another value. In this study, this will occur when a country moves
from a stable to a collapse regime. The probability of being in a particular
regime is inferred from the data. The two-state Markov-switching model is
estimated using annual data on real GDP per worker for the period 1960-2004.
The variables included in the transition probability vector are the variables
that were identified as the main causes of output collapses – terms of trade,
institutional quality, output composition, and education.
The Model
In using Markov-switching models, the first challenge is to determine the
true number of regimes. The idea behind regime switching models is that the
parameters of the underlying data generating process of the observed time
series vector depends on an unobservable regime variable , the probability of
being in a certain state. If there is insufficient information in the series, the
regime classification will be weak. Badly parameterised switching models may
not be an improvement over models that do not allow for switching. 
Looking for the number of regimes is equivalent to looking for the number
of regression lines that will best fit the data. Figure 2 shows the graph of the
growth rate of Equatorial Guinea. It is clear from the graph that two
regression lines are a better fit to the data than one.
I begin by assuming two regimes, then adding an additional regime. I find
that a two-regime model captures the series appropriately. The finding of two
regimes can be confirmed by a further test. I apply a regime classification
measure (RCM) introduced by Ang and Bekaert (2002). The RCM provides a
measure of the information of regime switches available in the data. The
measure relies on the estimated filtered probabilities of the states from the
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the following:
1   T
RCM = 400X —  ps1, t (1 – ps1, t),
T  t=1
where ps1, t is the smoothed probability of being in regime 1 at time t, and the
constant normalises the statistic to between 0 and 100. The same method can
be applied to ps2, t. In the case of a perfect regime classification, the inferred
state probability for a particular data point would be 0. A statistic of 100
indicates no regime classification. Here, the RCM for state 1 is 19.58 and for
state 2 is 36.48 indicating that both regimes are well defined.
To apply a regime-switching model, I must first consider how growth
evolves. S.I.C. and A.I.C. criterion both choose an AR(1) model of growth.
Therefore, I assume there are 2 possible states of nature and that in each
state, growth follows an AR(1) process. 
yit = αst + β1styt–1i + εit
st,
εit
st ~ i.i.d.N(0, σst
2) 
(3)
yit is the growth rate of country i in period t.
st is the state that is in effect at time t.
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p[st = 1|st–1 = 1] = p11
p[st = 2|st–1 = 2] = p22 (4)
p[st = 2|st–1 = 1] = p12
p[st = 1|st–1 = 2] = p21
P11 is the probability of an economy remaining in regime 1 at time t, given that
the economy was in regime 1 at time t – 1; 1 – P11 is the probability of an
economy switching from regime 1 to regime 2. P22  is the probability of
remaining in regime 2 at time t, given that the economy was in regime 2 at
time t – 1; 1 – P22 is the probability of switching from regime 2 to regime 1. 
To allow the transition probabilities to depend on the macroeconomic
variables obtained in Section II in order to explain the probability of switching
from one regime to another, we follow the method of Diebold et al. (1994). In
this case, Equation (4) becomes:
p[st = 1|st–1 = 1] = p11(ψt)
p[st = 2|st–1 = 2] = p22(ψt)
(5)
p[st = 2|st–1 = 1] = p12(ψt)
p[st = 1|st–1 = 1] = p21(ψt)
where ψt is the country-specific vector of exogenous variables.
The transition probabilities are modelled as a logistical functional form 
exp (β11(1) + β11(2) * ψt)
p11 = —————–——————————————————
(1 + exp β11(1) + β11(2)ψt + exp (β12(1) + β12(2) * ψt)
exp (β11(1) + β11(2) * ψt)
p12 =1 – —————–——————————————————
(1 + exp β11(1) + β11(2)ψt + exp (β12(1) + β12(2) * ψt)
(6)
exp (β21(1) + β21(2) * ψt)
p21 =1 – —————–——————————————————
(1 + exp β21(1) + β22(2)ψt + exp (β22(1) + β22(2) * ψt)
exp (β21(1) + β21(2) * ψt)
p22 = —————–——————————————————
(1 + exp β21(1) + β22(2)ψt + exp (β22(1) + β22(2) * ψt)
To estimate the model, the complete data likelihood function must be
specified. The conditional density depends on both current and past regimes.
The state variable St is unobservable so it is not possible to construct the
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applied by Hamilton (1990).
V RESULTS
The results of the model for the entire sample of countries are presented
below.
Table 5: Markov-Switching Model with Time-Varying Transition Probabilities
Within Regime Estimates of yit = αst + β1st yt–1t + εit
st
Constant AR Coefficient σs Implied LR 
Growth
State 1 0.00527* 0.095*** 0.0320 0.71%
State 2 –0.0105* 0.065* 0.0551 –1.31%
p11 = 0.89
p22 = 0.76
***denotes significance at 1 per cent level, **denotes significance at 5 per cent level,
*denotes significance at 10 per cent level.
State 1 has a low positive growth rate, relatively low autocorrelation and
quite a large standard deviation of growth rates. State 2 has a negative growth
rate, lower autocorrelation and a much larger standard deviation. The
transition probabilities show that the level of persistence in each regime is
quite high indicating that when a country is in a particular regime in one
period, it is highly likely to remain there in the next period. State 1 is a more
stable regime than state 2. However, the volatility levels associated with
regime 1 are high. This would seem to indicate that the levels of volatility
associated with output in sub-Saharan Africa, are higher than elsewhere, even
for countries that are performing relatively well. This confirms the results
shown in Table 2. Increasing volatility stems mostly from external shocks. The
probability of an economy remaining in a stable growth regime increases with
education, institutional quality, improving terms of trade and increased
concentration on manufacturing industries. Countries with good quality
institutions, terms of trade, and diversity of output spend a higher proportion
of time in the stable regime. When these countries do end up in the collapse
regime, they are unlikely to remain there as they are in a better position to
recover from shocks to output. In contrast, predominantly agricultural
economies, with deteriorating terms of trade and poor institutional quality are
much more likely to spend a significant amount of time in state 2, the
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–1.31 per cent on average and extremely high levels of volatility. The
probability of remaining in a collapse regime, given that an economy was in a
collapse regime at time t-1 is 0.76. Thus, an economy that is in a collapse
regime is likely to remain there. This is in all probability because these
economies are poorly equipped to deal with a shock thus precluding the
possibility of stable and sustainable growth. It is important to note that every
country in the sample visits each regime at some point in time. 
It is the amount of time spent in each regime that is crucial in determining
economic growth performance of an individual country. 
The expected duration of remaining in a particular regime is given by:
∞ 1
E(Dj) =  kP(Dj = k) = —–—, (7)
k=0 1 – Pjj
While the expected duration for the entire sample of countries is 9.47
years for state 1 and 4.25 years for state 2, the expected durations differ
substantially across countries. A higher proportion of time spent in state 2
corresponds to being more susceptible to, and slower to recover from, adverse
shocks. Table 6 shows the probabilities associated with, and the expected
duration of remaining in, each regime for every country in the sample. The
higher the probability associated with a regime, the longer the expected
duration of remaining in that regime. 
For example, the countries with the longest expected durations of
remaining in regime 1 include Botswana, Malawi, Equatorial Guinea and
Lesotho. The average long-term growth rates of these countries are all
positive- 6.45 per cent, 1.67 per cent, 6.95 per cent and 3.24 per cent
respectively. These countries also spend a relatively short amount of time in
regime 2. Conversely, the countries with the longest expected duration of
remaining in regime 2 include Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Niger,
and Liberia. The average long-term growth rates are –4.16 per cent, –1.92 per
cent, –0.70 per cent and –2.61 per cent respectively. The results imply that
some countries recover from shocks relatively quickly, while others such as
Liberia and Somalia are much slower to emerge
Neither of the regimes identified are particularly desirable. Although state
1 is more desirable than state 2, it is worth noting that this is a regime that is
characterised by very low, almost stagnant growth rates. The results lend
support to the notion that many sub-Saharan African economies are stuck in
a poverty trap and are just too poor to achieve sustainable positive growth.
The results also confirm that an output collapse can trigger an economy to
switch regimes, thus altering its long-run growth path.
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The findings here have important policy implications. Growth and
development in sub-Saharan Africa have stagnated over the last four decades.
In order for these economies to achieve sustained economic growth, the
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Table 6: Probabilities and Expected Durations of Each Regime
P11 Duration P22 Duration
State 1 State 2
Botswana 0.96 25 years 0.61 2.56 years
Burkina Faso
Burundi 0.88 8.33 years 0.86 7.14 years
Cameroon 0.78 4.54 years 0.92 12.5 years
Central African Republic
Chad 0.90 10 years 0.88 8.33 years
Congo, Democratic Republic 0.71 3.44 years 0.94 16.67 years
Congo, Republic 0.74 3.85 years 0.93 14.29 years
Cote d’Ivoire 0.91 11.11 years 0.83 5.88 years
Equatorial Guinea 0.92 12.5 years 0.85 6.67 years
Ethiopia 0.88 8.33 years 0.66 2.95 years
Gabon 0.89 9.09 years 0.77 4.35 years
Gambia, The 0.96 25 years 0.49 1.96 years
Ghana 0.67 3.03 years 0.37 1.59 years
Guinea 0.88 8.33 years 0.86 7.14 years
Guinea Bissau 0.70 3.33 years 0.72 3.57 years
Kenya 0.91 11.11 years 0.85 6.67 years
Lesotho 0.93 14.29 years 0.75 4 years
Liberia 0.83 5.88 years 0.95 20 years
Madagascar 0.62 2.63 years 0.95 20 years
Malawi 0.94 16.67 years 0.81 5.26 years
Mali 0.90 10 years 0.85 6.67 years
Mauritania 0.86 8.33 years 0.84 6.25 years
Mauritius 0.92 12.5 years 0.64 2.77 years
Mozambique 0.51 2.04 years 0.69 3.23 years
Namibia 0.61 2.56 years 0.74 3.85 years
Niger 0.21 1.27 years 0.90 10 years
Nigeria 0.87 7.69 years 0.78 4.55 years
Rwanda 0.87 7.69 years 0.38 1.61 years
Senegal 0.73 3.7 years 0.865 7.41 years
Somalia
South Africa 0.90 10 years 0.35 1.54 years
Tanzania 0.78 4.54 years 0.89 9.09 years
Togo 0.95 20 years 0.84 6.25 years
Uganda 0.84 6.25 years 0.915 11.76 years
Zambia 0.83 5.88 years 0.91 11.11 years
Zimbabwe 0.91 11.11 years 0.86 7.14 years
02 Byrne Article_ESRI Vol 41  25/02/2010  14:30  Page 37frequencies of output collapses, which drive economies into regime 2, must be
substantially reduced. There appear to be a number of factors that has
constrained the growth and development process in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Sub-Saharan African economies are largely dependent on volatile primary
commodities for export due to limited diversification. Africa has an abundance
of natural resources but the opportunities to maximise the contribution they
can make to an economy are not being taken. Many sub-Saharan African
economies have a comparative advantage in natural resources but poor
governance means they cannot exploit this advantage. Improving natural
resource management through improved institutional quality, increasing
participation in decision-making and improving social protection for workers
could help these economies increase revenues. Improving land rights and
governance could enhance agricultural production, and the potential for an
expansion of agricultural trade through increased diversification should be
considered. Moving away from primary industries to manufacturing
industries can also increase market access opportunities and leave economies
less vulnerable to deteriorating terms of trade. Major investments in
infrastructure will enhance the supply side capacity, improving output. This
approach may depend on increased donor grants. Another way to limit their
vulnerability to price volatility is to form new international commodity
associations.
One of the most frequently cited reasons that sub-Saharan African
economies stagnate is their poor quality of institutions. In order to use public
and private resources, and financial aid effectively, an improvement of public
financial management is essential. Improved transparency and accountability
is required if sub-Saharan African economies are to attract foreign
investment. Currently, potential external investors overestimate the risk
associated with investing in African countries. 
VI CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Although the typical cross-section approach to understanding economic
growth has yielded many important results, this approach ignores the
different paths an individual country may take. Further analysis of this kind
is unlikely to add considerably to our current understanding of the growth
process. The regime-switching model gives an important understanding of
output collapses in sub-Saharan Africa and their subsequent impact on the
long-term growth performance of an economy. Both of the regimes identified in
the analysis displayed high levels of volatility around the mean, confirming
that the sub-Saharan region as a whole is more volatile in terms of output.
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occurrence in sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere. The incidences of output
collapses could be reduced by increasing institutional quality or improving the
terms of trade by switching away from agricultural industries to focus more on
manufacturing or service-based industries. However, the question remains as
to whether these countries have the ability to make such a switch. It is likely
that significant infrastructural investment in education, transport,
telecommunications etc. would be required to make this a feasible policy.
Nations at the G8 summit in 2009 have pledged US$20 billion over the next
three years to promote sustainable agricultural development in developing
countries. The money is to be used to provide emergency food aid and to
implement a comprehensive strategy focused on sustainable agricultural
development. 
Although the processes of improving institutional quality and terms of
trade would be difficult and slow-moving policies to implement in practice,
lower volatility levels should encourage foreign investment, further enhancing
economic growth prospects and limiting output collapses. Through these
mechanisms, sub-Saharan Africa may gradually emerge from the poverty trap
and begin to conform to economic growth theory and converge with other
economies. One possible extension of this analysis is to include emerging and
industrialised countries in the model and allow for a greater number of
regimes to be identified. This would allow for a direct comparison of volatility
levels and long-term growth paths of different kinds of economies while
allowing for non-linearities of the process.
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